Instituições e educação - parte I

Com propriedade, afirmou Douglass North (1990, p. 80):

Throughout most history the institutional incentives to invest in productive knowledge have been largely absent, and even in Third World economies today the incentives are frequently misdirected. If Third World countries do invest in education, they frequently misdirect the investment into higher education, not primary education (which has a much higher social rate of return than does higher education in Third World countries).

A crítica é que, em um país subdesenvolvido, os retornos da educação são mais altos caso se invista em educação primária. A Coréia, por exemplo, expandiu maciçamente em todos os níveis de educação, mas evidentemente, espalhou-se em primeiro lugar o primário.

North, entretanto, na hora de explicar os motivos pelos quais as instituições dos países subdesenvolvidos têm esses problemas, afirma que:

But if the market was imperfect so that the private rates of return were so low as not to make such private investument worthwhile, then the correct investment (in primary education) could have been undertaken by public investment, assuming members of the society appreciated that there was a high social rate of return on such investment. But the fact that such public investment was not undertaken or was misdirected suggests not only high transaction costs resulting in imperfect markets, but also that imperfect knowledge and understanding make up the subjetive models of actors. (p. 80).

Será que essa justificativa faz sentido para entender o problema da educação em países como o Brasil?