Páginas

segunda-feira, 29 de outubro de 2007

Seleção natural e ação coletiva

Estou lendo um interessante paper de Elinor Ostrom* sobre ação coletiva. Há trechos inusitados como uma explicação evolucionária para a sobrevivência de características não "instrumentalmente racionais", como diria Weber. Se é verdade ou não, é outra história:

"Human evolution occurred mostly during the long Pleistocene era that lasted for about 3 million years, up to about 10,000 years ago. During this era, humans roamed the earth in small bands of hunter-gatherers who were dependent on each other for mutual protection, sharing food, and providing for the young. Survival was dependent not only an aggressively seeking individual returns but also on solving many day-to-day collective action problems. Those of our ancestors who solved these problems most effectively, and learned how to recognize who was deceitful and who was a trustworthy reciprocator, had a selective advantage over those who did not (Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992)" (Ostrom, 2000, p. 143).

Não costumo encontrar esse tipo de coisa em papers de economia freqüentemente.

Barkow, J. H.; Cosmides, L.; Tooby, J. eds. (1992). The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective Action and the Evolution os Social Norms. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 3. Summer, pp. 137-158.

Nenhum comentário: